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Abstract 
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stylized facts. Our model refers to an economy where workers want to monopolize the labor 
market. For this purpose, they bring about a social security act, which requires old workers to 
retire and young workers to pay transfers to retirees. The first prescription serves to reduce 
labor supply in order to realize a monopoly gain. The second prescription serves to give old 
workers share to the gain. As we will show, the social security program emerging in our 
model is similar to the typical program described above. 
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1 Introduction
In many countries politicians try to reform social security programs. Economists
assist them and provide academic advice. For the advice to be good, it is nec-
essary that economists have a good positive theory of social security. Without
having this theory, they may misconceive people’s political preferences and sup-
port the wrong reform proposals. To illustrate this point, consider the following
example. Assume that the majority of people wants to have a social security pro-
gram that induces the elderly to retire. Economists, however, believe in a theory
which predicts that people want to have a program which makes them save for
their old age. Due to this theory, they support reform proposals maximizing the
rate of return on savings instead of inducing retirement. This is just the oppo-
site of what people want to have. The advice economists give in this example is
misleading.
The example shows that it is quite important to have a good positive theory
of social security. But what distinguishes a good theory from a bad one? A
good theory should be able to explain the properties of a typical social security
program. These properties were explored by Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999a),
who studied the social security programs of 89 countries and found that the
programs are surprisingly similar (see also Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin 1999b and
Sala-i-Martin 1996). The typical program is designed as follows:
1. It is organized as a pay-as-you-go system (98 percent of the 89 countries).
2. It is …nanced with a payroll tax (96 percent).
3. Employers and employees share the tax (90 percent).
4. Bene…ts are largely independent of asset income (89 percent).
5. Bene…ts are increasing with the taxes paid (85 percent).
6. Bene…ts induce retirement (75 percent of the 73 countries for which data
were available).
In what follows, we will refer to these properties as the stylized facts of social
security.
Beginning with Browning (1975), economists have produced quite a lot of
theories of social security. The models are surveyed by Boadway and Wildasin
(1989), Breyer (1994), Drost (1998), Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b, 1999c),
and Verbon (1988, 1993). Hardly any model is able to explain all stylized facts,
however. An exception is the model developed by Sala-i-Martin (1996), which we
shall brie‡y review for this reason. The model refers to an economy that exhibits
an externality in human capital. Due to this externality, workers whose human
capital stock is low supply an ine¢ciently high amount of labor. These workers
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are usually old, and thus it is e¢cient to pay a pension to old workers who are
willing to leave the labor force. The result is a social security program similar
to the typical one described above. Since the young generation pays a pension
to the old generation, the program is pay-as-you-go. Since the pension serves to
buy the elderly out of the labor force, it induces retirement. Since retirement is
bene…cial for employees and employers, it is …nanced by both of these groups.
So we could continue and show that Sala-i-Martin’s model explains all stylized
facts. Therefore we should classify it as a good positive theory of social security.
Although Sala-i-Martin’s model already replicates the stylized facts, we will
present an alternative model in this paper. Our motivation is that Sala-i-Martin
uses a nonstandard assumption and that he gets a controversial result. The
nonstandard assumption is that the economy exhibits an externality in human
capital. Though some empirical studies support this assumption (for references
see Sala-i-Martin 1996), it is only used in a minority of economic models. The
controversial result is that the social security program is e¢cient. This result
is a direct consequence from the externality, but many liberal economists will
not believe in it. Our model is not based on the assumption of an externality
in human capital, nor does it produce the result of an e¢cient social security
program. Nevertheless it can replicate the stylized facts of social security.
The intuition behind our model can be explained as follows. Consider an
economy where workers aim at monopolizing the labor market. To achieve this
aim, they convince the parliament to pass a social security act that consists of
two parts:
§ 1 Old workers retire.
§ 2 Young workers pay transfers to old workers.
The …rst part serves to reduce labor supply, to push up wages, and, hence, to
realize a monopoly gain. The second part serves to give old workers share to
the gain. Of course, entrepreneurs do not like this policy. To defend themselves
against it, they enter into negotiations with the workers. As a result, the act is
modi…ed as follows:
§ 1 Old workers retire.
§ 2 Young workers pay transfers to old workers.
§ 3 The age of retirement is higher than in the original act.
§ 4 Entrepreneurs pay transfers to old workers.
Again the …rst and the second part serve to realize a monopoly gain and to give
old workers share to it. The third and the fourth part serve to reduce the gain
by re-increasing labor supply and to compensate the workers for the reduction.
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The social security program de…ned by this act turns out to be very similar to
the typical program described above: it is pay-as-you-go, it induces retirement,
it is …nanced by workers and entrepreneurs, and so on. Our model can therefore
replicate the stylized facts of social security without making use of the externality
assumption or producing the e¢ciency result.
We analyze the idea of a monopolistic social security program in an equilib-
rium model that is combined with a bargaining game. To keep the analysis as
transparent as possible, we make two simpli…cations. First, we use a static and
not a dynamic equilibrium model. This way we deviate from what is usual in the
literature (and due to important intertemporal e¤ects advisable), but a dynamic
model would become very complicated so that we could not explain our idea in
a transparent way. Second, we use a bargaining solution where bargaining ine¢-
ciencies are exogenous and not endogenous. This way we ignore some interesting
game theoretic developments, but we are able to keep the degree of complexity
low and the degree of transparency high. After presenting our model in detail,
we will brie‡y discuss the consequences of these simpli…cations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe a
benchmark economy where a social security program does not exist. In section
3 we examine an economy where workers convince the parliament to introduce a
social security program. In section 4 we analyze an economy where entrepreneurs
and workers negotiate for a modi…cation of the program. In section 5 we conclude
and discuss, among other things, the predictions our model generates about the
future of social security.
2 Omitting Social Security
Consider a simple economy that consists of old workers, young workers, and
entrepreneurs. The agents are heterogeneous and di¤er in human capital and
wealth. Each old worker o 2 f1; 2; :::; Nog has an exogenous asset income ao 2
(¡1;1). She also has an exogenous human capital endowment ho 2 [0;1). If
she chooses to work for `o 2 [0; 1] units of time and earns the wage w 2 [0;1)
per unit of human capital and working time, she will receive the labor income
who`o . She spends her asset and her labor income on consumption co. Her budget
constraint is
co = who`o + ao: (1a)
The old worker chooses consumption and working time so as to maximize utility.
Her utility function is
uo = co¡ ¯`o; (1b)
where ¯ 2 [0;1) is a parameter measuring the marginal disutility of labor. If we
assume that ¯ is su¢ciently small (¯ < who), the old worker wants to work as
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much as possible. Her labor supply then is
`o = 1: (1c)
This implies that her maximum level of utility is
uo = who + ao ¡ ¯: (1d)
Note that we assume the utility function to be linear. This assumption serves to
simplify the analysis of the bargaining games, which will be discussed later on.
Young workers are modeled in a similar way. Each young worker y 2 f1; 2; :::; Nyg
has an exogenous asset income ay 2 (¡1;1) and an exogenous human capital
endowment hy 2 [0;1). If she works for `y 2 [0; 1] units of time, she will earn the
labor income why`y. She uses her asset and her labor income for consumption
cy. Her budget constraint is
cy = why`y + ay: (2a)
The young worker chooses consumption and working time so as to maximize
utility. Her utility function is
uy = cy ¡ ¯`y: (2b)
If we assume that the marginal disutility of labor ¯ is su¢ciently small (¯ < why),
the young worker will supply
`y = 1 (2c)
units of labor. As a result, her maximum level of utility is
uy = why + ay ¡ ¯: (2d)
Note that the young worker does not save for her old age. Moreover, she does
not take account of future utility. These assumptions are mainly used to keep
the model as transparent as possible. They also serve to underline that the
motivation for creating a social security program is purely intratemporal in our
model (as opposed to the intertemporal savings motive that dominates in other
models).
Each entrepreneur e 2 f1; 2; :::; Neg has the asset income ¡ae 2 (¡1;1).
She does not have any labor income, but if she hires he 2 [0;1) units of human
capital from the workers and uses it to produce a homogeneous good ye = h°e
with ° 2 (0; 1), she will obtain the pro…t income h°e ¡ whe. She spends her asset
and her pro…t income on consumption ce. Her budget constraint is
ce = h
°
e ¡ whe ¡ ae: (3a)
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The entrepreneur chooses consumption and human capital input so as to maxi-
mize utility
ue = ce: (3b)
The necessary condition for a utility maximum is
w = °h°¡1e : (3c)
The condition implies that each entrepreneur hires the same amount of human
capital (he = (°=w)
1=(1¡°)). It also implies that the entrepreneurs’ maximum
level of utility is
ue = (1 ¡ °) h°e ¡ ae: (3d)
Note that we do not distinguish between young and old entrepreneurs. Distin-
guishing between generations would be possible, but it would merely complicate
the model without yielding any additional insights.
Old workers, young workers, and entrepreneurs interact in the markets for
assets, human capital, and goods. The market for assets clears if
PNo
o=1 ao +PNy
y=1 ay =
PNe
e=1 ae. By introducing the de…nitions Ao ´
PNo
o=1 ao, Ay ´
PNy
y=1 ay,
and Ae ´
PNe
e=1 ae, we can write this market clearance condition more simply as
Ao + Ay = Ae: (4a)
The market for human capital clears if
PNo
o=1 ho+
PNy
y=1 hy = heNe. By introducing
the de…nitions Ho ´
PNo
o=1 ho and Hy ´
PNy
y=1 hy, we can rewrite this condition
as
Ho+Hy = heNe: (4b)
Due to Walras’ Law, equations (4a) and (4b) also imply the clearance of the
goods market.
In the equilibrium the old workers, the young workers, and the entrepreneurs
must maximize utility, and the markets for assets, human capital, and goods must
clear. This means that the equations (1a) to (4b) must hold simultaneously.
Using these equations, we can compute the equilibrium distribution of utility.
The old workers’ equilibrium level of utility is
uo = °
µ
Ho +Hy
Ne
¶°¡1
ho+ ao ¡ ¯; (5a)
the young workers’ equilibrium level of utility is
uy = °
µ
Ho +Hy
Ne
¶°¡1
hy + ay ¡ ¯; (5b)
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and the entrepreneurs’ equilibrium level of utility is
ue = (1 ¡ °)
µ
Ho+Hy
Ne
¶°
¡ ae: (5c)
As we will see in the next section, these utility levels change when a social security
program is introduced into the benchmark model. This will generate political
support for or resistance against the introduction.
3 Introducing Social Security
Everybody knows that it is pro…table to be a monopolist. The workers in our
model have this knowledge too. They understand very well that they would be
better o¤ if they could form some kind of stable cartel. The problem with cartels
is that they tend to be unstable. So what can workers do in order to stabilize
their cartel? One possibility they have is to protect it by law. They can use their
political power (which is based on the fact that No + Ny is usually larger than
Ne) and bring about a law that forces all or some of them to reduce labor supply.
In particular, they can convince the parliament to pass a social security act that
forces the old workers to retire. Of course, retirees will only support this law if
they participate in the monopoly gain. So it is necessary to give them a pension
which transfers part of the gain from the active workers to the passive ones.
For a better understanding of this idea, consider the diagram which is depicted
in …gure 1. The diagram shows the labor demand curve D (which is drawn as a
straight line, for simplicity) and the two labor supply curves S1 and S2. While
S1 refers to the situation before the introduction of a social security program, S2
refers to the situation after it. Due to the retirement regulations, the introduction
of the program shifts the labor supply curve to the left. As a consequence,
equilibrium labor supply falls fromH1 to H2 and the equilibrium wage rises from
w1 to w2. This implies that the workers’ surplus rises from d + e to b + d and
the entrepreneurs’ surplus falls from a+ b+ c to a. So workers are better o¤ and
entrepreneurs are worse o¤ when a social security program is introduced. The
e¤ect of the program thus is similar to that of a monopoly. Next we integrate
this idea into the model developed in the previous section.
The introduction of a social security program changes the equilibrium distri-
bution of utility. Because old workers do not work any longer and receive bene…ts
bo 2 [0;1), their equilibrium level of utility changes into
vo = ao + bo: (6a)
Because young workers experience a wage increase from ° [(Ho +Hy) =Ne]
°¡1 hy
to ° (Hy=Ne)
°¡1 hy and pay taxes ty 2 [0;1), their equilibrium level of utility
6
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Figure 1: The E¤ects of Introducing a Social Security Program
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changes into
vy = °
µ
Hy
Ne
¶°¡1
hy + ay ¡ ¯ ¡ ty: (6b)
Because entrepreneurs pay higher wages and hire less workers, their new equilib-
rium level of utility is
ve = (1¡ °)
µ
Hy
Ne
¶°
¡ ae: (6c)
Obviously, entrepreneurs must su¤er a utility loss. Workers, however, can have
a utility gain (at least in the aggregate), which we will show next.
The workers’ aggregate change in utility is
¢U =
NoX
o=1
(vo¡ uo) +
NyX
y=1
(vy ¡ uy) : (7a)
By inserting equations (5a), (5b), (6a) and (6b), we can express the change as
¢U =
NoX
o=1
"
bo ¡ °
µ
Ho +Hy
Ne
¶°¡1
ho + ¯
#
+
NyX
y=1
"
°
µ
Hy
Ne
¶°¡1
hy ¡ ty ¡ °
µ
Ho +Hy
Ne
¶°¡1
hy
#
: (7b)
After rearranging, we get
¢U =
NoX
o=1
bo ¡ °
µ
Ho+Hy
Ne
¶°¡1
Ho + ¯No
+ °
µ
Hy
Ne
¶°¡1
Hy ¡
NyX
y=1
ty ¡ °
µ
Ho +Hy
Ne
¶°¡1
Hy: (7c)
By assuming that the social security budget is balanced (
PNo
o=1 bo =
PNy
y=1 ty), we
obtain
¢U = ¯No¡
"
°
µ
Ho+Hy
Ne
¶°¡1
(Ho +Hy)¡ °
µ
Hy
Ne
¶°¡1
Hy
#
: (7d)
So the aggregate change in utility is
¢U = ¯No ¡ °
µ
Ho +Hy
Ne
¶°
Ne ¡
µ
Hy
Ne
¶°
Ne
¸
: (7e)
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This equation shows that the workers’ utility change is composed of two parts.
The …rst part (¯No) is a utility gain, which results from the fact that old workers
have more leisure now. The second part (° [¢]) is a utility loss, which results from
the fact that aggregate output and, hence, the workers’ share in it are lower now.
If we assume that the marginal disutility of labor measured by ¯ is su¢ciently
large, the utility gain will outweigh the utility loss so that the total change in
aggregate utility is positive. In this case workers can achieve a monopoly gain
and will introduce a social security program.
Given that workers introduce the program, how do they distribute the monopoly
gain, i.e. how do they determine taxes and bene…ts? We assume that workers
negotiate for the distribution of the gain and that the outcome of the negotiation
is determined by the Nash bargaining solution. This solution implies that the
gain is distributed equally among old and young workers so that each worker
receives the same share:1
vo ¡ uo = vy ¡ uy = ¢UNo + Ny
: (8a)
If we combine this equation with equations (5a), (5b), (6a) and (6b) and rear-
range, we obtain the bene…t formula
bo =
½
¢U
No + Ny
¾
¡
(
¯ ¡ °
µ
Ho +Hy
Ne
¶°¡1
ho
)
(8b)
and the tax formula
ty =
("
°
µ
Hy
Ne
¶°¡1
¡ °
µ
Ho+Hy
Ne
¶°¡1#
hy
)
¡
½
¢U
No + Ny
¾
: (8c)
The bene…t formula shows that bene…ts serve to close the gap between the target
utility gain ¢U= (No +Ny) and the actual utility gain ¯¡° [(Ho+Hy)=Ne]°¡1 ho
(which results from a rise in leisure and a loss of wages). The higher a retiree’s
human capital stock, the wider is the utility gap (because of a larger wage loss)
1To prove this implication, maximize the log Nash product
NoX
o=1
ln (vo ¡ uo) +
NyX
y=1
ln (vy ¡ uy) ;
with uo, uy, vo, vy being de…ned by (5a), (5b), (6a), (6b), subject to the budget constraint
NoX
o=1
bo =
NyX
y=1
ty :
The implication can be derived from the …rst-order conditions.
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and the higher are the retiree’s bene…ts. Likewise, the tax formula shows that tax
payments serve to close the gap between the actual utility gain ° (Hy=Ne)
°¡1 hy¡
° [(Ho +Hy) =Ne]
°¡1 hy (which results from a rise in wages) and the target utility
gain ¢U= (No +Ny). The higher a young worker’s human capital stock, the wider
is the utility gap (because of a larger wage rise) and the higher are the worker’s
tax payments.
Now we have determined all elements of the social security program emerging
in our model. We summarize them in
Proposition 1 (Original Social Security Program) The original social se-
curity program is organized as follows. First, old workers completely retire so
that
`o = 0:
Second, old workers receive bene…ts that are determined by the formula
bo = k1ho + k2:
Third, young workers pay taxes that are determined by the formula
ty = k3hy ¡ k4:
In these formulas the variables k1 to k4 are positive constants that are independent
of individual parameters like ho or ay.
As the proposition shows, the program is similar to the typical program described
in the introduction:
1. It is pay-as-you-go.
2. It is …nanced with a payroll tax (because taxes depend on human capital
and, thus, on wages).
3. Bene…ts are independent of asset income.
4. Bene…ts are increasing with the taxes paid (because both bene…ts and taxes
are positively related to human capital).
5. The program induces retirement.
Altogether, our model can thus explain …ve of the six stylized facts of social
security. The only fact it cannot explain is why entrepreneurs contribute to the
…nancing of the social security program. In the next section, we will extend our
basic model to incorporate employer contributions.
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4 Modifying Social Security
Everybody knows that a monopolistic market is ine¢cient. The entrepreneurs
in our model have this knowledge too. They understand very well that everyone
could be better o¤ if the labor market were competitive. But what can the
entrepreneurs do to de-monopolize the market? One thing they can do is to
negotiate for a modi…cation of the social security act. They can o¤er the workers
to take over part of the tax payments if these are willing to re-increase labor
supply. Because this o¤er leads to a Pareto-superior situation, the workers will
accept it. The result is a new social security act where entrepreneurs pay taxes
te 2 [0;1) and old workers do not retire completely, but supply labor ` 2 (0; 1).
For a better understanding of this idea, consider the diagram in …gure 2. The
diagram is similar to that in …gure 1, but it additionally shows the supply curve S3
that refers to the situation after the modi…cation of the social security program.
Because retirement regulations are less strict in this situation, the modi…cation
shifts the supply curve from S2 to S3. As a consequence, equilibrium labor supply
rises from H2 to H3 and the equilibrium wage falls from w2 to w3. This implies
that the workers’ surplus falls from b+ d+ g to d + e+ g+ h, the entrepreneurs’
surplus rises from a to a+ b+ c, and the total surplus rises from a+ b+ d+ g to
a+b+ c+ d+ e+ g+ h (so that the deadweight loss falls from c+ e+f + h+ i to
f+ i). Given appropriate side payments, workers and entrepreneurs are therefore
better o¤ when they modify the social security program.
Note that workers and entrepreneurs are best o¤ when their negotiation leads
to a complete suspension of the retirement regulations. If the modi…ed social
security act is free from these regulations, S3 will be identical to S1 and the total
surplus will reach its maximum. However, an e¢cient bargaining outcome like
this requires the absence of imperfections in the negotiation process. Because this
is not very realistic (otherwise one could not observe strikes, delayed agreement,
and other ine¢cient bargaining outcomes in reality), we exclude the case that re-
tirement regulations are suspended completely. We thus assume that ` < 1. By
using this assumption we exogenously introduce an ine¢ciency in the bargaining
model. It would be possible to generate this ine¢ciency endogenously (see Cal-
abuig 1999 and Myerson 1985), but this would merely increase the complexity of
our model without yielding additional insights.
The modi…cation of the social security act changes the equilibrium distribution
of utility. The equilibrium utility level of the old workers now is
v 0o = ao + b
0
o + °
µ
`Ho +Hy
Ne
¶°¡1
ho`¡ ¯`: (9a)
The equilibrium utility level of the young workers is
v0y = °
µ
`Ho +Hy
Ne
¶°¡1
hy + ay ¡¯ ¡ t0y: (9b)
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Figure 2: The E¤ects of Modifying the Social Security Program
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The equilibrium utility level of the entrepreneurs, …nally, is
v0e = (1¡ °)
µ
`Ho+Hy
Ne
¶°
¡ ae ¡ t0e: (9c)
Note that we have marked some variables with primes in order to distinguish
them from the corresponding variables in the last section.
The aggregate change in utility is
¢V =
NoX
o=1
(v0o ¡ vo) +
NyX
y=1
¡
v0y ¡ vy
¢
+
NeX
e=1
(v0e ¡ ve) : (10a)
As we prove appendix A, this equation is identical to
¢V =
µ
`Ho +Hy
Ne
¶°
Ne ¡
µ
Hy
Ne
¶°
Ne ¡ ¯`No: (10b)
This result shows that the aggregate change in utility is composed of two parts.
The …rst part is a utility gain, which results from the fact that aggregate output
is higher now. The second part is a utility loss, which results from the fact that
old workers have less leisure now. If we assume that ¯ is su¢ciently small, the
total change in aggregate utility is positive. In this case it is advantageous for
the workers and the entrepreneurs to modify the social security program. (Up
to this point we have introduced various restrictions for ¯. Levels of ¯ satisfying
these restrictions exist whenever ° is su¢ciently small. For a proof see appendix
B.)
Given that agents modify the program, how do they determine the workers’
and the entrepreneurs’ tax payments and the retirees bene…ts? We again assume
that taxes and bene…ts are determined in a negotiation, which is modeled using
the Nash bargaining solution. As a consequence, the aggregate utility gain is
distributed equally among agents:2
v0o ¡ vo = v0y ¡ vy = v0e ¡ ve =
¢V
No +Ny + Ne
: (11a)
2This can be proved by maximizing the log Nash product
NoX
o=1
ln (v0o ¡ vo) +
NyX
y=1
ln
¡
v0y ¡ vy
¢
+
NeX
e=1
ln (v0e ¡ ve)
subject to the budget constraint
NoX
o=1
b0o =
NyX
y=1
t0y +
NeX
e=1
t0e
and analyzing the …rst-order conditions.
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If we combine this equation with equations (6a), (6b), (6c), (8b), (8c), (9a), (9b),
and (9c) and rearrange, we obtain a bene…t formula and two tax formulas. The
bene…t formula is
b0o =
½
¢U
No + Ny
+
¢V
No+ Ny +Ne
¾
¡
(
¯
¡
1¡ `¢ ¡ "°µHo+Hy
Ne
¶°¡1
¡ °
µ
`Ho +Hy
Ne
¶°¡1
`
#
ho
)
; (11b)
the tax formula for the workers is
t0y =
("
°
µ
`Ho +Hy
Ne
¶°¡1
¡ °
µ
Ho +Hy
Ne
¶°¡1#
hy
)
¡
½
¢U
No+ Ny
+
¢V
No +Ny + Ne
¾
; (11c)
and the tax formula for the entrepreneurs is
t0e =
(
(1 ¡ °)
µ
`Ho +Hy
Ne
¶°
¡ (1¡ °)
µ
Hy
Ne
¶°)
¡
½
¢V
No+ Ny +Ne
¾
: (11d)
These formulas are similar to those obtained in the last section. They show that
bene…ts and taxes serve to close the gap between the actual and the target utility
gain.
Now we have determined all elements of the modi…ed social security program.
We summarize them in
Proposition 2 (Modi…ed Social Security Program) The modi…ed social se-
curity program is organized as follows. First, old workers partially retire so that
0`
o = `:
Second, old workers receive bene…ts that are determined by
b0o = k
0
1ho + k
0
2:
Third, young workers pay taxes that are determined by
t0y = k
0
3hy ¡ k04:
Fourth, entrepreneurs pay taxes that are determined by
t0e = k
0
5:
In these formulas the variables k01 to k05 are positive constants that are independent
of individual parameters like ho or ay (for k01 to be positive we assume that ` is
su¢ciently large).
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As the proposition shows, the modi…ed program is similar to the typical program
described in the introduction:
1. It is pay-as-you-go.
2. It is …nanced with a payroll tax.
3. Entrepreneurs and workers share the tax.
4. Bene…ts are independent of asset income.
5. Bene…ts are increasing with the taxes paid.
6. The program induces retirement.
Because entrepreneurs and workers share the social security tax, the modi…ed
program is even closer to the typical program than the original one. With the
program being modi…ed, our model can therefore replicate all stylized facts of
social security.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented a model that can explain the stylized facts of
social security. The main idea of the model is that workers introduce a social
security program in order to monopolize the labor market. The program forces
the old workers to retire and the young workers to transfer part of the resulting
monopoly gain to the old. In order to defend themselves against the monopoly,
entrepreneurs negotiate with the workers for a modi…cation of the program. The
outcome of the negotiation is that retirement regulations are relaxed and that
entrepreneurs take over part of the tax payments. Social security can therefore
be seen as an instrument used by the workers to exploit the entrepreneurs, where
the degree of exploitation is limited as long as entrepreneurs accept to …nance
part of the program.
Before we conclude, we are going to discuss three additional points. The
…rst point refers to an interesting implication of our model. It implies that the
size of a social security program positively depends on the political power of
the workers. The more power the workers have, the stricter are the retirement
regulations passed by the parliament, the higher is the monopoly gain enjoyed by
the workers, and the higher are the transfers paid to the retirees. The workers will
be particularly powerful if they are organized in strong unions. The social security
program should therefore be large in countries where unions are strong, and small
in others. In order to test this hypothesis, we have collected cross-country data
measuring the strength of the union sector and the size of the social security
program. A proxy for the strength of the union sector is the bargaining coverage
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rate (workers covered by collective agreements/all workers), data for which are
published by the OECD (1997). A proxy for the size of the social security program
is the social security share (expenditures for social security and welfare/gross
national product), data for which are given in Tabellini (1990). Using these data,
we can construct a sample that includes 17 industrialized countries and refers
to a period around 1980. In this sample the correlation coe¢cient between the
bargaining coverage rate and the social security share is 0:5. This indicates that
the size of a country’s social security program is indeed positively correlated with
the strength of the union sector and, thus, with the political power of the workers
in this country.
Another interesting point is that we can use our model to predict the future
of social security. To generate this prediction, we assume that the workers and
the entrepreneurs will eventually overcome the imperfections in the bargaining
process. When they reach this point, they will create an e¢cient social security
program that looks as follows. First, old workers are allowed to re-increase labor
supply to the competitive level. Returning to this level is necessary because
the economy would be ine¢cient otherwise. Second, entrepreneurs are forced
to pay a higher social security tax. Raising the entrepreneurs’ tax payments
is necessary because the workers require compensation for accepting the rise in
labor supply. Third, old workers are granted uniform bene…t payments. Unifying
bene…t payments is necessary because old workers do no longer retire, which
implies that they do no longer su¤er from reductions in wages, di¤erences in
which have to be neutralized by di¤erences in bene…t payments. Altogether, we
thus predict a suspension of the retirement regulations, a rise in the entrepreneurs’
tax payments, and a uni…cation of old-age pensions.
As a last point, we discuss the simplifying assumptions used in our model.
In particular, we examine whether these assumptions are crucial for our results.
One simpli…cation is that the model is static. In a static model we can show quite
clearly that the introduction of a social security program leads to a monopoly gain
for the workers. We must ignore, however, that it may also lead to a loss resulting
from a decline in capital accumulation and economic growth. Nevertheless, as
long as the monopoly gain is larger than this loss, our basic argument will not
change and our main results will continue to hold. Another simpli…cation is that
the number of entrepreneurs is …xed in our model. By …xing this number at
a given level, we can analyze the monopolistic power of the workers in a very
pointed way. We must disregard, however, that in practice the workers’ power is
restricted by the occupational or regional mobility of the entrepreneurs. These
can simply become workers or move abroad when the social security legislation
gets too monopolistic. Nevertheless, as long as the entrepreneurs’ mobility is
limited, our main results remain valid. A …nal simpli…cation is that imperfections
in the bargaining process are exogenous. Modelling them exogenously helps us
to keep the model as transparent as possible. As we believe, endogenizing them
would not change our main results.
16
Appendix A
In this appendix we compute the aggregate change in utility that can be achieved by modifying
the social security program. According to equation (10a), the aggregate change in utility is
¢V =
NoX
o=1
(v0o ¡ vo) +
NyX
y=1
¡
v0y ¡ vy
¢
+
NeX
e=1
(v0e ¡ ve) : (10a)
By inserting equations (6a), (6b), (6c), (9a), (9b), and (9c), we can express the change as
¢V =
NoX
o=1
"
b0o + °
µ
`Ho + Hy
Ne
¶°¡1
ho` ¡ ¯` ¡ bo
#
+
NyX
y=1
"
°
µ
`Ho + Hy
Ne
¶°¡1
hy ¡ t0y ¡ °
µ
Hy
Ne
¶°¡1
hy + ty
#
+
NeX
e=1
"
(1 ¡ °)
µ
`Ho + Hy
Ne
¶°
¡ t0e ¡ (1 ¡ °)
µ
Hy
Ne
¶°#
:
After rearranging, we get
¢V =
NoX
o=1
b0o + °
µ
`Ho + Hy
Ne
¶°¡1
`Ho ¡ ¯`No ¡
NoX
o=1
bo
+ °
µ
`Ho + Hy
Ne
¶°¡1
Hy ¡
NyX
y=1
t0y ¡ °
µ
Hy
Ne
¶° ¡1
Hy +
NyX
y=1
ty
+ (1 ¡ °)
µ
`Ho + Hy
Ne
¶°
Ne ¡
NeX
e=1
t0e ¡ (1 ¡ °)
µ
Hy
Ne
¶°
Ne:
By assuming that the social security budget is balanced (
PNo
o=1 bo =
PNy
y=1 ty and
PNo
o=1 b
0
o =PNy
y=1 t
0
y +
PNe
e=1 t
0
e), we obtain
¢V = °
µ
`Ho + Hy
Ne
¶°¡1 ¡
`Ho + Hy
¢
+ (1 ¡ °)
µ
`Ho + Hy
Ne
¶°
Ne
¡ °
µ
Hy
Ne
¶°¡1
Hy ¡ (1 ¡ °)
µ
Hy
Ne
¶°
Ne ¡ ¯`No:
So the aggregate change in utility is
¢V = °
µ
`Ho + Hy
Ne
¶°
Ne + (1 ¡ °)
µ
`Ho + Hy
Ne
¶°
Ne
¡ °
µ
Hy
Ne
¶°
Ne ¡ (1 ¡ °)
µ
Hy
Ne
¶°
Ne ¡ ¯`No;
which is identical to our result in equation (10b):
¢V =
µ
`Ho + Hy
Ne
¶°
Ne ¡
µ
Hy
Ne
¶°
Ne ¡ ¯`No: (10b)
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Appendix B
In this appendix we examine whether there are levels of ¯ that satisfy
¯ < °
µ
Ho + Hy
Ne
¶°¡1
ho; o 2 f1; :::; Nog ;
¯ < °
µ
Ho + Hy
Ne
¶°¡1
hy ; y 2 f1; :::;Nyg ;
¯ >
°
No
µ
Ho + Hy
Ne
¶°
Ne ¡
µ
Hy
Ne
¶°
Ne
¸
;
¯ <
1
`No
"µ
`Ho + Hy
Ne
¶°
Ne ¡
µ
Hy
Ne
¶°
Ne
#
:
For these levels of ¯ to exist, it is a necessary and su¢cient condition that
1
No
µ
Ho + Hy
Ne
¶°
Ne ¡
µ
Hy
Ne
¶°
Ne
¸
<
µ
Ho + Hy
Ne
¶°¡1
ho; o 2 f1; :::; Nog ;
1
No
µ
Ho + Hy
Ne
¶°
Ne ¡
µ
Hy
Ne
¶°
Ne
¸
<
µ
Ho + Hy
Ne
¶°¡1
hy; y 2 f1; :::; Nyg ;
1
No
µ
Ho + Hy
Ne
¶°
Ne ¡
µ
Hy
Ne
¶°
Ne
¸
<
1
°`No
"µ
`Ho + Hy
Ne
¶°
Ne ¡
µ
Hy
Ne
¶°
Ne
#
:
This condition holds for ° ! 0 (use L’Hôpital’s rule where necessary) and for small ° (because
terms are continuous in °). So levels of ¯ that satisfy the restrictions listed above exist whenever
° is su¢ciently small.
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